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Abstract
Ethical, social and human rights aspects of computing technologies have been discussed since the inception of these technolo-
gies. In the 1980s, this led to the development of a discourse often referred to as computer ethics. More recently, since the 
middle of the 2010s, a highly visible discourse on the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) has developed. This paper discusses 
the relationship between these two discourses and compares their scopes, the topics and issues they cover, their theoretical 
basis and reference disciplines, the solutions and mitigations options they propose and their societal impact. The paper argues 
that an understanding of the similarities and differences of the discourses can benefit the respective discourses individually. 
More importantly, by reviewing them, one can draw conclusions about relevant features of the next discourse, the one we 
can reasonably expect to follow after the ethics of AI. The paper suggests that instead of focusing on a technical artefact 
such as computers or AI, one should focus on the fact that ethical and related issues arise in the context of socio-technical 
systems. Drawing on the metaphor of ecosystems which is widely applied to digital technologies, it suggests preparing for a 
discussion of the ethics of digital ecosystems. Such a discussion can build on and benefit from a more detailed understanding 
of its predecessors in computer ethics and the ethics of AI.
Keywords Computer ethics · Ethics of AI · Artificial intelligence · Digital ethics
1 Introduction
The development, deployment and use of digital technolo-
gies has long been recognised as having ethical implications. 
Based on initial reflections of those implications by semi-
nal scholars such as Wiener [122], [123] and Weizenbaum 
[121], a stream of research and reflection on ethics and com-
puters emerged. The academic field arising from this work, 
typically called computer ethics, was and remains a thriving 
but nevertheless relatively small field that managed to estab-
lish a body of knowledge, dedicated conferences, journals 
and research groups.
While computer ethics continues to be a topic of discus-
sion, the dynamics of the ethical reflection of digital technol-
ogy changed dramatically from approximately the middle 
of the 2010s when the concept of artificial intelligence (AI) 
(re-)gained international prominence. The assumption that 
AI was in the process of fundamentally changing many soci-
etal and business processes with manifest implications for 
most individuals, organisations and societies led to a pleth-
ora of research and policy initiatives aimed at understanding 
ethical issues of AI and finding ways of addressing them.
The assumption underlying this paper is that one can rea-
sonably and transparently distinguish between the discourses 
on computer ethics and the one focusing on the ethics of AI. 
If this is the case, then it would be advantageous to partici-
pants in both discourses to better understand the differences 
and similarities between these two discourses. This paper, 
therefore, asks the research question: how and to what extent 
do the discourses of computer ethics and the ethics of AI dif-
fer from one another?
The paper is furthermore motivated by a second assump-
tion, which is that ethical reflection of digital technologies 
will continue to develop and that there will be future dis-
courses, based on novel technologies and their applications 
that go beyond both computer ethics and the ethics of AI. If 
this turns out to be true, then an understanding of the com-
monalities and persistent features of computer ethics and 
the ethics of AI may well provide insights into likely ethical 
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concerns that can be expected to arise in the next generation 
of digital technologies and their applications. The second 
question that the paper seeks to answer is, therefore: what 
can be deduced about a general ethics of digital technolo-
gies by investigating computer ethics and the ethics of AI?
These are important questions for several reasons. 
Answering them facilitates or improves mutual awareness 
and understanding of computer ethics and ethics of AI. Such 
an understanding can help both discourses identify current 
gaps existing ideas. For computer ethics scholars, this may 
be an avenue to contribute their work to the broader societal 
discourse on AI. For scholars involved in the ethics of AI 
debate, it may help to avoid repetition of settled discussion. 
But even more importantly, by comparing computer ethics 
and the ethics of AI, the paper can think beyond current 
discussions. A key contribution of the paper is the argu-
ment that an analysis of computer ethics and the ethics of AI 
allows for the identification of those aspects of the discourse 
that remain constant and are independent from specific tech-
nologies. The paper suggests that a weakness of both com-
puter ethics and the ethics of AI is their focus on a particular 
technology or artefact, i.e. computers or AI. It argues that a 
better understanding of ethical issues can be achieved by tak-
ing seriously the systems nature of digital technologies. One 
stream of research that has not been prominent in the ethics-
related debate is that of digital (innovation) ecosystems. By 
moving away from an artefact and looking at the ethics of 
digital ecosystems, it may be possible to proactively engage 
with novel and emerging technologies while the exact ter-
minology to describe them is still being developed. This 
would allow for paying attention early to the ethical aspects 
of such technologies.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sum-
marises the discourses on computer ethics and on the ethics 
of AI with a view to identifying both changing and constant 
aspects between these two. This includes a justification of 
the approach and a more detailed description of aspects and 
components of the discourses to be compared. This provides 
the basis for the description and critical comparison of the 
two discourses. The identification of overlaps and continuity 
provides the starting point for a discussion of a future-proof 
digital ethics.
2  Computer ethics and the ethics of AI
The argument of the paper rests on the assumption that one 
can reasonably distinguish between computer ethics and the 
ethics of AI. This assumption is somewhat problematic. A 
plausible reading is that the ethics of AI is simply a part or 
an extension of computer ethics. This paper therefore does 
not propose any categorical difference between computer 
ethics and the ethics of AI but simply suggests that it is an 
empirical phenomenon that these two discourses differ to 
some degree.
One argument that supports a distinction between com-
puter ethics and the ethics of AI is the level of attention they 
receive. While many of the topics of interest to computer 
ethics, such as privacy, data protection or intellectual prop-
erty, have raised societal and, thus, political interests, this 
has never led to the inclusion of computer ethics terminol-
ogy into a public policy discourse. This is very different for 
the ethics of AI, which is not just a thriving topic of aca-
demic debate, but which is explicitly dealt with by numerous 
policy proposals [104]. A related aspect of the distinction 
refers to the participants in the discourse. Where computer 
ethics is to a large extent an academic topic, the ethics of 
AI draws much more on contributions from industry, media 
and policy.
This may suffice as a justification for the chosen approach. 
The validity of these observations are discussed in more 
detail below. The following Fig. 1 aims to represent the logic 
of the research described in this paper.
The two blue ellipses on the left represent the currently 
existing discourses on computer ethics and the ethics of 
AI. The differences and similarities between these two are 
explored later in this section. From the insights thus gener-
ated the paper will progress to the question what can be 
learned about these existing discourses that can prepare 
Fig. 1  Representation of the 
research logic of the paper
Computer 
ethics Ethics of AI
Ethics of Digital 
Ecosystems
Differences and similaries
Implicaons and lessons learned
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the future discussion of the ethics of emerging digital 
technologies.
2.1  Methodology
The methodological basis of this paper is that of a literature 
review, more specifically of a comparison of two bodies of 
literature. Literature reviews are a key ingredient across all 
academic disciplines [42] and form at least part of most 
publications. There are numerous approaches to reviewing 
various bodies of literature that serve different purposes 
[115]. Rowe [106] suggests a typology for literature reviews 
along four different dimensions (goal with respect to theory, 
breadth, systematicity, argumentative strategy).
A central challenge for this paper is that the distinction 
between computer ethics and the ethics of AI is not clear-cut, 
but rather a matter of degree and emphasis. This is exacer-
bated by the fact that the terminology is ambiguous. So far, 
I have talked about computer ethics and the ethics of AI. 
Neither of these terms is used consistently. While the term 
computer ethics is well established, it is closely linked with 
other such as ethics of ICT [105], information technology 
ethics [110] or cyberethics [111]. Computer ethics is closely 
related to information ethics to the point where there are 
several publications that include both terms in the title [56] 
and [120]. The link between computer ethics and informa-
tion ethics is discussed in more detail under the scope of the 
topic below.
Just like there are different terms that overlap with com-
puter ethics, there are related terms describing ethics of AI, 
such as responsible AI [15, 38, 45, 118] or AI for good [17, 
69]. In addition, the term ethics is used inconsistently. It 
sometimes refers to ethics as a philosophical discipline with 
references to ethical theories. However, it often covers ad 
hoc concerns about particular situations or developments 
that are perceived as morally problematic. Many such issues 
could be equally well described as social concerns. Many of 
them also have a legal aspect of them, in particular where 
they pertain to established bodies of law, notably human 
rights law. The use of the term ’ethics’ in this paper, there-
fore, is a short hand for all these uses in the discourse.
The comparison of the discourses on computer ethics and 
ethics of AI, thus, requires criteria that allow to determine 
the content of the two discourses. An important starting 
point for the delimitation of the computer ethics discourse 
is the fact that there are several published accounts that 
review and classify this discourse. These notably include 
work undertaken by Terry Bynum [27–29] but also other 
reflective accounts of the field (H. T. [117]. There are several 
seminal publications that deserve to be mentioned as defin-
ing the discourse of computer ethics. Jim Moor [93] notably 
asked the question "what is computer ethics?". And Deborah 
Johnson [73] provided the answer in the first textbook on the 
topic, a work that was also initially published in 1985. The 
description of computer ethics in this paper takes its point 
of departure from these defining publications. It also takes 
into account other sources which include a number of edited 
volumes, work published in relevant conferences (notably 
Computer Ethics Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE), Computers 
and Philosophy (CAP) and ETHICOMP) but also published 
accounts of ethics of computing in adjacent fields, such as 
information systems or computing [113].
The debate on the ethics of AI is probably more diffi-
cult to delineate than the one on computer ethics. However, 
there are some foundational texts and review articles that 
can help with the task. Müller’s [97]recent overview in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia provides a good overview. There are 
several review and overview papers, in particular of ethical 
principles [54, 72]. In addition, there is a quickly growing 
literature covering several recent monographs [41, 45] and 
several new journals, including the new Springer journal AI 
and Ethics [84]. These documents can serve as the starting 
point to delineate the discourse, which also covers many 
publications from neighbouring disciplines as well as policy 
and general media contributions. It should be clear that these 
criteria do not constitute a clear delineation and there will 
be many contributions that could count under both headings 
and some that may fit neither. However, despite the fuzziness 
of the demarcation line, this paper submits that a distinction 
between these discourses is possible to the point where it 
allows a meaningful comparison.
In order for such a comparison to be interesting, it 
requires a clarification of which aspects one can expect to 
differ, which is the subject of the following section.
2.2  Differences between computer ethics 
and the ethics of AI
This section starts with an overview of the aspects that are 
expected to differ between the two discourses and then dis-
cusses each of these in more detail The obvious starting 
point for a comparison of the discourses on computer ethics 
and the ethics of AI is the scope of the discourse, in particu-
lar the technologies covered by it. This leads to the topics 
that are covered and the issues that are of defining interest 
to the discourse. The next area is the theoretical basis that 
informs the discourse and the reference disciplines that it 
draws from. Computer ethics and the ethics of AI may differ 
on the solutions to these issues and the mitigation strategies 
they propose. Finally, there is the question of the broader 
importance and impact of the discourses.
Figure 2 represents the different aspects of the two dis-
courses that will now be analysed in more detail.
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2.2.1  Scope: technology and its features
The question of the exact scope of both discourses has been 
the subject of reflection within the discourse itself and has 
varied over time. The early roots of computer ethics as rep-
resented by Wiener’s [122] work was inspired by the ini-
tial developments of digital computing and informed by his 
experience of contributing to these during the Second World 
War. Wiener observed characteristics of these devices, such 
as an increased measure of autonomy and independence 
from humans which he saw as problematic. Similarly, Wei-
zenbaum’s [121] experience of natural language processing 
(an area that forms part of AI) led him to voice concerns 
about the potential social uses of technology (such as the 
ELIZA conversational system).
By the time the term "computer ethics" was coined in the 
1980s, mainframe computers were already well established 
in businesses and organisations, and initial indications of 
personal computer use could be detected. The Apple II was 
launched in 1977, the BBC Micro and the IBM 5150 came 
to market in 1981, paving the way for wide-spread adoption 
of PCs and home computers. At this time, it was reasonably 
clear what constituted a computer and the discourse, there-
fore, spent little time on definitions of underlying technology 
and instead focused on the ethically problematic character-
istics of the technology.
The initial clarity of the debate faded away because of 
technical developments. Further miniaturisation of com-
puter chips, progress in networking, the development of the 
smartphone as well as the arrival of new applications such 
as social media and electronic commerce radically changed 
the landscape. At some point in the 2000s, so many con-
sumer devices had integrated computing devices and capa-
bilities that the description of something as a computer was 
no longer useful. This may explain the changing emphasis 
from the term "computer ethics" to "information ethics", 
which can be seen, for example, by the change of the title of 
Terry Bynum’s [29] entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy which started out in 2001 as "Computer Ethics: 
Basic Concepts and Historical Overview" and was changed 
in 2008 to "Computer and Information Ethics". The differ-
ence between computer ethics and information ethics goes 
deeper than the question of technology and we return to it 
below, but Bynum’s changed title is indicative of the prob-
lem of delimiting the scope of computer ethics in the light 
of rapid development of computing technologies.
The challenges of delimiting computer ethics are mir-
rored by the challenge of defining the scope of the ethics of 
AI. The concept of AI was coined in 1956 [88] in a funding 
proposal that was based on the conjecture that " every aspect 
of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in prin-
ciple be so precisely described that a machine can be made 
to simulate it". It set out to explore " how to make machines 
use language, form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds 
of problems now reserved for humans, and improve them-
selves." These ambitions remain largely intact for current AI 
research, but they do not explain why ethics of AI became a 
pervasive discourse from the mid-2010s.
The history of AI (cf. [19]) includes a history of philo-
sophical and ethical questions [31]. AI is a field of research, 
generally accepted to be a sub-field of computer science that 
developed several themes and bodies of theory, which point 
to different concepts of AI. Shneiderman [107] suggests a 
simple distinction between two goals of AI that is helpful to 
understand the conceptual challenge faced by the ethics of 
AI discourse. The two goals that Shneiderman sees for AI 
are: first, emulation to understand human abilities and then 
improve on them and, second, the application of technical 
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methods to develop products and services. This distinction 
of goals aligns well with the well-established distinction 
between narrow and strong or general AI. Narrow AI aims 
to fulfil specifically described goals. In recent years, it has 
been hugely successful in the rapidly developing sub-field 
of machine learning [10], based on the implementation of 
deep learning through artificial neural networks and related 
technologies [114]. Narrow AI, in particular as realised in 
machine learning using neural networks to analyse and learn 
from large datasets, has roots going back decades. However, 
it is widely believed that these well-known technologies 
came to the fore because of advances in computing power, 
development of algorithms and the availability of large data-
sets [21, 65].
In addition to this narrow AI aimed at solving practical 
problems, there is the long-standing aim to develop tech-
nologies with human-like abilities. These systems would be 
able to transfer learning across domains and are sometimes 
called artificial general intelligence [41]. Artificial general 
intelligence forms part of the earliest attempts to model 
intelligent behaviour through symbolic representations of 
reality [94], sometimes referred to as good old-fashioned 
AI or GOFAI [55]. It remains contested whether artificial 
general intelligence is achievable and, even if so, whether 
it could be done using current technological principles (i.e. 
digital computers and Turing machines) [56].
There are attempts to interpret the difference between nar-
row and general AI as a difference in temporal horizon, with 
narrow AI focusing on short-term goals, whereas general AI 
is seen as a long-term endeavour [13, 32]. Notwithstanding 
the validity of this interpretation, the inclusion of narrow 
and general AI in the discussion means that its technical 
scope is large. It includes well-understood current technolo-
gies of machine learning with ethically relevant properties 
(e.g. need for large datasets, opacity of neural networks) 
as well as less determined future technologies that would 
display human-like properties. This breadth of the technical 
scope has important consequences for possible issues arising 
from the technology, as will be discussed below.
2.2.2  Topics and issues
The topics and issues discussed by both discourses cover all 
aspects of life where computers or AI have consequences for 
individuals and groups. It is, therefore, beyond the scope of 
this paper to provide a comprehensive overview of all topics 
discussed. Instead, the aim of this section is to provide an 
indication of some key topics with the aim of showing which 
of them have changed over time or remained stable.
In the introduction to 1985 special issue on computer 
ethics of the journal Metaphilosophy, the editor [46] stated 
that the central issue of computer ethics would be the 
replacement of humans by computers, in particular in tasks 
requiring judgment. It was clear at the time, however, that 
other issues were relevant as well, notably invasions of pri-
vacy, computer crime and topics related to the way com-
puter professionals deal with clients and society, includ-
ing ownership of programmes, responsibility for computer 
errors and the structure of professional codes of ethics. 
This structure is retained in the 2001 version of Bynum’s 
[29] encyclopaedia entry which lists the following issues: 
computers in the workplace, computer crime, privacy and 
anonymity, intellectual property, professional responsibil-
ity, globalisation and the metaethics of computer ethics. 
Picking up the discussion of ethics of computing in the 
neighbouring discipline of information systems, Mason 
[87] proposed the acronym PAPA to point to key issues: 
privacy, accuracy, property and accessibility.
A more recent survey of the computing-oriented lit-
erature suggests that the topics discussed remain largely 
stable [113]. It may, therefore, not be surprising that there 
is much continuity from computer ethics in the ethics of 
AI debate. One way to look at this discussion is to distin-
guish between issues directly related to narrow AI, broader 
socio-technical concerns and longer-term questions. Cur-
rent machine learning approaches require large datasets 
for training and validation and they are opaque, i.e. it is 
difficult to understand how input gets translated into out-
put. This combination leads to concerns about privacy and 
data protection [26, 47] as well as the widely discussed 
and interrelated questions of lack of transparency [3, 109], 
accountability, bias [34] and discrimination [96]. In addi-
tion, current machine learning systems raise questions of 
reliability, security [7, 10, 25] and safety [45].
The impact of AI-enabled socio-technical systems on 
society and communities is covered well in the discourse. 
AI is a key enabler of the digital transformation of organi-
sations and society which may have significant impact with 
ethical relevance. This includes economic concerns, nota-
bly questions of employment [77, 124] as well as labour 
relationships including worker surveillance [97] as well 
as concerns about justice and distribution [96]. Digital 
transformation can affect political power constellations 
[98] and support as well as weaken citizen participation. 
Possible consequences of use AI include changes to the 
nature of warfare [103] and environmental impacts [99]. 
Concerns are raised about how machines may enhance or 
limit human agency [18, 40].
Two concepts that figure prominently in the AI ethics 
discourse are those of trust and trustworthiness. The AI 
HLEG’s [6] structured its findings and recommendations 
in a way that seems to suggest that ethics is considered, 
to strengthen trustworthiness of AI technologies, which 
then engenders trust and, thus, acceptance and use. This 
functional use of ethics is philosophically highly problem-
atic but seems to be driven by a policy agenda that sees 
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the desirability of AI as an axiom and ethics as a means to 
achieve targets for uptake.
Finally, there is some debate about the long-term issues 
related to artificial general intelligence. Due to the open 
question whether current type of technologies can achieve 
this [108], it is contested how much attention should be 
given to questions such as the singularity [80], superintel-
ligence [22], etc. These questions do not figure prominently 
in current policy-oriented discussions, but they continue to 
attract interest in the scientific community and beyond.
The topics and issues discussed in computer ethics and 
the ethics of AI show a high level of consistency. Many of 
the discussions of computer ethics are continued or ech-
oed in the ethics of AI. This includes questions of privacy 
and data protection, security, but also wider societal conse-
quences of technical developments. At the same time, some 
topics are less visible, have morphed or moved into different 
discourses. The computer ethics discourse, for example, had 
a strong stream of discussion of ownership of data and com-
puter code with a heavy emphasis on the communal nature 
of intellectual property. This discussion has changed deeply 
with some aspects appearing to be settled practice, such as 
ownership of content now administered through structures 
that are based on business models that emerged taking into 
account the competing views on intellectual property. Netf-
lix, iTunes, etc. employ a distribution service and subscrip-
tion model that appears to satisfy consumers, producers and 
intermediaries. Other aspects of ownership remain highly 
contested, such as the right to benefit from secondary use 
of process data, which underpins what Zuboff [126] calls 
surveillance capitalism.
2.2.3  Theoretical basis and reference disciplines
While there is a high level of continuity in terms of issues 
and topics, the theoretical positions vary greatly between 
computer ethics and the ethics of AI. This may have to do 
with the reference disciplines [11, 14, 78], i.e. the academic 
disciplines in which the contributors to the discourses were 
originally trained or from which they adopt theoretical posi-
tions they apply to computing and AI [85].
Both computer ethics and the ethics of AI are highly 
interdisciplinary and draw from a range of reference dis-
ciplines. In both cases there is a strong influence of phi-
losophy, which is not surprising given that ethics is a disci-
pline of philosophy. Similarly, there is a strong presence of 
contributors from technical disciplines. While the computer 
ethics discourse draws on contributions from computer sci-
entists, the ethics of AI has attracted attention from more 
specialised communities that work on AI, notably at present 
the machine learning community. The most prominent mani-
festation of this is the FAT / FAccT community that focuses 
on fairness, accountability and transparency (https:// facct 
confe rence. org/). There are also contributions from other 
academic fields, such as technology law, social sciences 
including science and technology studies. Some fields such 
as information systems are less visible than one could expect 
them to be in the current discourse [112].
While details of the disciplinary nature of the contribu-
tions to both discourses are difficult to assess, there are nota-
ble changes in the use of foundational concepts. In computer 
ethics, there is a strong emphasis on well-established ethi-
cal theories, notably duty-based theories [75, 76], theories 
focusing on consequences of actions [16, 89] as well as theo-
ries focusing on individual character and virtue [9],A. C. 
[83]. Ethical theorising has of course not been confined to 
these and there are examples of other ethical theories applied 
to computing, such as the ethics of care [4, 60], or discourse 
ethics [91]. In addition there have been proposals for ethical 
approaches uniquely suited to computing technologies, such 
as disclosive ethics [23, 70].
The ethics of AI discourse also uses a rich array of ethical 
theories [82], but it displays an undeniable focus on princi-
ple-based ethical guidelines [72]. This approach is dominant 
in biomedical ethics [37] and its adoption by the ethics of 
AI discourse may be explained by the well-established bio-
medical ethics procedures which promise practical ways of 
dealing with ethical issues, as well as an increasing interest 
of the biomedical ethics community in computing and AI 
technologies. However, it should be noted that this reliance 
on principalism [39] is contested within the biomedical com-
munity [79] and has been questioned in the AI field [67, 92], 
but at present remains dominant.
A further significant difference between computer ethics 
and the ethics of AI is that the latter has a much stronger 
emphasis on the law. One aspect of this legal emphasis is the 
recognition that many of the issues discussed in the ethics of 
AI are well-established issues of human rights, e.g. privacy 
or the avoidance of discrimination and physical harm. There 
are, thus, numerous vocal contributors to the discourse that 
emphasise human rights as a source of normativity in the 
ethics of AI as well as a way to address issues (Access [2, 
43, 81, 96, 102]. This legal emphasis translates into a focus 
on legislation and regulation as a way of dealing with these 
issues, as discussed in the next section.
2.2.4  Solutions and mitigation
One can similarly observe some consistency and continu-
ity but also some discontinuity with regards to proposals 
for addressing these issues. This is clearly a complex set 
of questions that depend on the issue in question and on 
the individual, group or organisation that is to deal with it. 
While it is, thus, not possible to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the different ways in which the issues can be 
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resolved or mitigated, it is possible to highlight some differ-
ences between the two discourses [120].
One proposal that figured heavily in the computer 
ethics discourse that is less visible in the ethics of AI 
is that of professionalism. [8, 30, 74]. While it was and 
remains controversially discussed whether and to what 
degree computer experts are, should be or would want 
to be professionals, the idea of institutionalising profes-
sionalism as a way to deal with ethical issues has driven 
the development of organisations that portray themselves 
as professional bodies for computing [24, 62]. The uncer-
tain status of computing as a profession is reflected by 
the status of AI, which is probably at best be regarded as 
a sub-profession.
Both discourses underline the importance of knowl-
edge, learning and education as conditions of success-
fully navigating ethical questions [20]. Both ask the ques-
tion which help can be provided to people working in the 
design and development of technology and aim to develop 
suitable methodologies [68]. This is the basis of various 
"by design" approaches [33, 64, 86] that are based on the 
principles of value-sensitive design [58], [85]. Specific 
methodologies for incorporating ethical considerations in 
organisational practice can be found both in the computer 
ethics debate [63, 66] as well as the ethics of AI discourse 
[7, 45, 48].
One area where the ethics of AI debate appears to be 
much more visible and impactful than computer ethics is 
that of legislation and regulation. This does not imply that 
the ethics of AI has a greater fundamental affinity to legisla-
tion, but it is based on the empirical observation that ethi-
cal (and other) issues of AI are perceived to be in need of 
legislation due to their potential impact (see next section). 
Rodrigues [104] provides an overview of recent legisla-
tive agendas. The most prominent example is probably the 
European Commission’s proposed Regulation for AI (Euro-
pean [50] which would bring in sweeping changes to the AI 
field, mostly based on earlier ethical discussion. In addition 
to proposed legislation in various jurisdictions, there are 
proposals for the creation of new regulatory bodies [44], 
European [51] and international structures to govern AI [71, 
119]. It is probably not surprising that some actors in the 
AI field actively campaign against legislation and industry 
associations such as the Partnership on AI but also company 
codes of conduct, etc. can be seen as ways of heading off 
legislation.
Computer ethics, on the other hand, also touched on and 
influenced legislative processes concerning topics in its field 
of interest, notably data protection and intellectual property. 
However, the attention paid to AI by legislators is much 
higher than it ever was to computers in general.
2.2.5  Importance and impact
One reason for the high prevalence of legislation and regu-
lation with regards to AI is the apparent importance and 
impact of the technology. AI is generally described as having 
unprecedented impact on most aspects of life which calls 
for ethical attention. Notwithstanding the accuracy of this 
narrative, it is broadly accepted across academia, policy and 
broader societal discourse. It is also the mostly unquestioned 
driver for the engagement with ethics. Questions about the 
nature of AI, its characteristics, and its likely and certain 
consequences are dealt with under the implicit assumption 
that they must be dealt with due to the importance of the 
technology.
The computer ethics debate does not share this unques-
tioned assumption of the importance of its subject mat-
ter. In fact, it was a recurrent theme of computer ethics to 
ask whether it was needed at all [57], H. [116]. This is, of 
course, a reasonable question to ask. There are a number of 
fields of applied ethics, e.g. medical ethics, business ethics 
or environmental ethics. But there are few, if any, that focus 
on a particular artefact, such as a computer. So, why would 
computer ethics be called for. Moor [93] famously proposed 
that it is the logical malleability, the fact that intended uses 
are not even foreseen by the designer, that sets computers 
apart from other artefacts, such as cars or airplanes. This 
remains a strong argument that also applies to current AI. 
With the growing spread of computers, first in organisa-
tions, then through personal and mobile computing which 
facilitated everyday application including electronic com-
merce and social media, computer ethics could point to the 
undeniable impact of computing technology which paved 
the way for the now ubiquitous reference to the impact of AI.
3  Towards an ethics of digital ecosystems
So far, this article has suggested that computer ethics and 
the ethics of AI can be read as two related, but distinct dis-
courses and it has endeavoured to elucidate the differences 
and similarities between these two. While this should have 
convinced the reader that such a distinction is possible and 
helpful in understanding both discourses, it is also clear that 
other interpretations are possible. The ethics of AI can be 
seen as a continuation of the computer ethics discourse that 
has attracted new participants and led to a shift of topics, 
positions and impact. Both interpretations allow for a critical 
analysis of both discourses with a view to identifying their 
shared strengths and weaknesses and an exploration of what 
can be learned from them that can prepare the next discourse 
that can be expected to arise.
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This question is motivated by the assumption that the 
ethics of AI discourse is not the final step in the discus-
sion. AI is many things, but it is also currently a hype and 
an academic fashion. This is not to deny its importance but 
a recognition that academia, like policy and general dis-
cussions follow the technology hype cycle [52] and atten-
tion to technologies, management models and research 
approaches have characteristics of fashion cycles [1, 
12]. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that the current 
focus on AI will peak and be replaced by another topic 
of debate. The purpose of this section is to discuss what 
may emerge from and follow the ethics of AI discourse 
and how this next stage of the debate can best profit from 
insights generated by the computer ethics and the ethics 
of AI discourses.
The term "computer ethics" lost some of its appeal when 
computing technologies became pervasive and integrated 
into many other devices. When a computer is in every phone, 
car and even most washing machines and refrigerators, then 
the term "computer ethics" becomes too fuzzy to be useful. 
A similar fate is likely to befall AI, or may already have 
done so. On the one hand, "AI" as a term is already too 
broad, as it covers everything from specific machine learning 
techniques to fictional artificial general intelligence. On the 
other hand, it is too narrow, given that it excludes many of 
the current and emerging technologies that anchor part of its 
future impact, such as quantum computing, neuromorphic 
technologies, the Internet of Things, edge computing, etc. 
And we can of course expect new technologies and terminol-
ogy to emerge to add to this complexity.
One weakness that both computer ethics and the ethics of 
AI share is their apparent focus on a particular piece of tech-
nology. Ethical, social, human rights and other issues never 
arise from a technology per se, however, but result from the 
use of technologies by humans in societal, organisational 
and other setting. This is not to suggest that technologies 
are value neutral, but that the affordances that they possess 
[59, 100] can play out differently in different environments.
To prepare for the next wave of ethics of technology dis-
cussion that will succeed the ethics of AI, it may, therefore, 
be advisable to take a slightly different perspective, one that 
reduces the focus on particular technologies. One family of 
such perspectives are based on systems theory [99]. There 
are a number of such theories that have been applied to com-
puting technologies, such as complex adaptive systems [90] 
or soft systems [35, 36].
A possible use of the systems concept to understand the 
way technology and social environments interact is that of an 
ecosystem. The metaphor of ecosystems to describe AI and 
its broader social and ethical consequences has already been 
employed widely by scholars [53] as well as policymak-
ers. The European Commission, for example, in its White 
Paper (European [49] that prepared the proposed Regulation 
(European [50] framed European AI policy in terms of an 
ecosystem of excellence and an ecosystem of trust, with the 
latter representing ethical, social and legal concerns. The 
OECD [101] similarly proposes the development of a digital 
ecosystem for AI. The World Economic Forum [125] under-
lines the logic of this terminology when it emphasises the 
importance of a systems-wide approach, if responses to the 
ethics of AI are to be successful.
From a scholarly perspective, it is interesting to observe 
that a body of research has developed since the mid-1990s 
that uses the concept of an ecosystem to describe how tech-
nologies are used in the economic system [5, 61, 95]. This 
discourse is of interest to this paper because it has developed 
a rich set of theoretical positions, substantive insights and 
methodologies that can be used to understand specific socio-
technical systems. At the same time, there has been very 
little emphasis in this discourse on the ethical and normative 
aspects of these ecosystems. This paper does not offer the 
space to pursue this argument in more detail, but can suggest 
that combining these different perspectives and looking at 
the ethics of digital (innovation) ecosystems can provide a 
helpful new perspective.
The benefit of using such a digital ecosystems-based 
approach is that it moves away from a particular technology 
and opens the view to the way in which technical develop-
ments interact with social developments, which broadens the 
view to encompass application areas, social structures soci-
etal environments as well as technical affordances. Actual 
ethical concerns are affected by all of these different factors 
and the dynamics of their relationships.
The proposal arising from this insight is, thus, that, to 
prepare the next wave of ethics and technology discussion, 
the focus should not be on predicting the next big technol-
ogy, but rather to explore how ethical issues arise in socio-
technical (innovation) ecosystems. This is a perspective that 
can be employed right now and used to better understand the 
ethics of AI or computing more generally. It invites detailed 
empirical observations of the social realities of the develop-
ment, deployment and use of current and past technology. 
It is similarly open to sophisticated ethical and theoretical 
investigations. This understanding can then be the baseline 
for exploring consequences of technological and social 
change. Making use of this perspective for the current ethics 
of AI debate would have the great benefit that the question of 
adequately defining AI loses its urgency. The key question 
then becomes how socio-technical innovation ecosystems 
develop, which is a question that is open to the inclusion of 
other types of technology from quantum computing to well-
established computational and other technological artefacts.
Taking this perspective, which might be called the "eth-
ics of digital ecosystems" moves beyond individual tech-
nologies and allows keeping track of and continuing estab-
lished ethical discussions. An ethical analysis of digital 
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ecosystems will need to delineate the systems which will 
be required to determine the capabilities of these ecosys-
tems. The capabilities, in turn will be what gives rise to 
possible social applications and the resulting benefits and 
concerns. Whatever the next technological hype will be, it 
is a safe bet that it will continue at least some trends from 
the past and that the corresponding ethical debates will 
remain valid. For example, it is plausible that future digital 
technologies will make use of, analyse and produce per-
sonal data, hence continuing the need for considerations of 
privacy and data protection. Security, safety and reliability 
of any future socio-technical system are similarly a good 
bet in terms of future relevance.
The focus on broader innovation ecosystem furthermore 
means that many of the currently discussed topics can be 
better framed as relevant topics of discussion. Questions 
of political participation, economic justice or human 
autonomy are much more easily understood as aspects of 
socio-technical systems than as intrinsically linked to a 
particular technology. The change of perspective towards 
digital ecosystems can, thus, strengthen the plausibility 
and relevance of some of the current topics of debate.
The same can be said for the discussion of possible 
mitigations. By focusing on digital innovation ecosystems, 
the breadth of possible mitigation strategy automatically 
increases. In computer ethics or ethics of AI, the focus 
is on technical artefacts and there is a temptation to link 
ethical issues as well as responses to these issues to the 
artefacts themselves. This is where approaches such as 
value-sensitive design or ethics by design derive their 
legitimacy from. The move away from the artefact focus 
towards the socio-technical ecosystem does not invalidate 
such approaches but clearly shows that the broader context 
needs to be included, thus opening up the discussion for 
regulation, legislation, democratic participation, societal 
debate as means to shape innovation ecosystems.
The move beyond the ethics of AI towards an ethics of 
digital innovation ecosystems will further broaden the dis-
ciplines and stakeholder groups involved in the discussion. 
Those groups who have undertaken research on computer 
ethics will remain important, as will the additional groups 
that have developed or have moved to exploring the eth-
ics of AI. However, the move towards digital innovation 
ecosystems makes it clear that additional perspectives will 
be required to get a full understanding of potential prob-
lems and solutions. Innovation ecosystem research is done 
in fields like business studies and information systems, 
which have much to contribute, but have traditionally 
had limited visibility in computer ethics and ethics of AI. 
Such a broadening of the disciplines and fields involved 
suggests that the range of theoretical perspectives is also 
likely to increase. Traditional theories of philosophical 
ethics will doubtlessly remain relevant and the focus on 
mid-level principles that the ethics of AI has promoted are 
similarly likely to remain important for guiding ethical 
reflection. However, a broader range of theories is likely 
to be applied, including systems theories, theories from 
business and organisational studies as well as the literature 
on innovation ecosystems.
4  Conclusion
This paper started from the intuition that there is a notice-
able difference between the discourses on computer ethics 
and the ethics of AI. It explored this difference with a view 
to examining how understanding it can help us prepare 
for the inevitable next discourse, which will follow the 
current discussion of ethics of AI. The analysis of the two 
discourses has outlined that there are notable differences 
in terms of scope of the discussion, topics and issues, 
theoretical basis and reference disciplines, solutions and 
mitigations and expected impacts. It is, thus, legitimate 
to draw a dividing line between the two discourses. How-
ever, it has also become clear that there is much continuity 
and overlap and to a significant degree, the ethics of AI 
discourse is a continuation and extension of the computer 
ethics discourse. This part of the analysis presented in the 
paper should help participants in both discourses to more 
clearly see similarities and discontinuities and appreciate 
where research has already been done that can benefit the 
respective other discourse.
The exact insights to be gained from the review of the 
two discourses clearly depends on the prior knowledge of 
the observer. Individuals who are intimately familiar with 
both discourses may be aware of all the various angles. 
However, participants of the computer ethics discourse 
who have not followed the ethics of AI debate can find 
insights with regards to current topics and issues, e.g. the 
broader socio-economic debates that surround AI. They 
can similarly benefit from an understanding of how bio-
medical principalism is being applied to AI, which may 
offer avenues of impact, solutions and mitigations that 
computer ethics tended to struggle with. Similarly a new 
entrant to the ethics of AI debate may benefit from an 
appreciation of computer ethics by realising that many of 
the topics have a decade long history that there are numer-
ous ethical positions and mitigation structures that have 
been well established and do not need to be reinvented.
Following from these insights, the paper then moved 
to the question what the next discourse is likely to be. 
This part of the paper is driven by the recognition that the 
emphasis on a particular technology or family of technolo-
gies, be this computers or AI, is not particularly helpful. 
Technologies unfold their ethical benefits and problems 
when deployed and used in the context of socio-technical 
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systems. It is less the affordances of a technology per se, 
but the way in which those affordances evolve in practical 
contexts that are of interest to ethical reflection. There are 
numerous ways in which these socio-technical systems can 
be described, and this paper has proposed that the concept 
of innovation ecosystems may offer one suitable approach.
The outcome of the paper is, thus, the suggestion to 
start to prepare the discourse of the ethics of digital inno-
vation ecosystems. This will again be a somewhat different 
discourse from the ones on computer ethics and the ethics 
of AI, but can also count as a continuation of the former 
two. The shift of the topic from computing or AI gives 
this discourse the flexibility to accommodate existing and 
emerging technologies from quantum computing to IoT 
without requiring a major shift of the debate. Maybe more 
importantly, it will require a more focused attention to the 
social side of innovation ecosystems, which means that 
aspects like application area and the local and cultural 
context of use will figure prominently.
By calling for this shift of the debate, the paper pro-
vides the basis for such a shift and can help shape current 
debates in this direction. This is particularly necessary 
with regards to the ethics of AI, which otherwise may be 
locked into mitigation strategies ranging from legislation 
and regulation to standardisation and organisational prac-
tice with a focus on the concept of AI, which may misdi-
rect efforts away from the areas of greatest need.
This shift of the debate and the attention to the ethics of 
innovation ecosystem will not be a panacea. The need for 
a delimitation of the subject of debate will remain, which 
means that the exact content or membership of an innova-
tion ecosystem that raises ethical questions will remain. 
Systems-based approaches raise questions of individual 
agency and the locus of ethics, which the dominant ethical 
theories may find difficult to answer. The innovation eco-
systems construct is also just an umbrella term underneath 
which there will be many specific innovation ecosystems, 
which means that the attention to the empirical realisation 
of such systems will need to grow.
Despite the fact that this shift of the debate will require 
significant additional efforts, it is still worth considering. 
The currently ubiquitous discussion of the ethics of AI 
will continue for the foreseeable future. At the same time 
it is already visibly reaching its limitations, for example 
by including numerous ethical issues that are not unique to 
AI. In order for the discussion to remain specific and allow 
the flexibility to react to future developments, it will need 
to reconsider its underpinnings. This paper suggests that 
this can be achieved by refocusing its scope and explicitly 
embracing digital innovation ecosystems as the subject of 
ethical reflection. Doing so will ensure that many of the 
lessons that have been learned over years and decades of 
working on the ethics of computing and AI will remain 
present and relevant, and that there is a well-established 
starting point from which we can engage with the next 
generations of digital technologies to ensure that their 
creation and use benefit humanity.
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